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I. INTRODUCTION
Juries usually decide whether a defendant's conduct in a tort
suit conforms to the standard required by law.' The jury provides a
source of community values when it decides the reasonableness of a
party's conduct.2 The jury performs an important role in this regard
on issues invoking community values, where judges and juries most
frequently come to different conclusions. 3
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA7) creates a right to
sue for disability-based discrimination and to recover damages similar
to those in a tort suit.4 Among other issues, a jury may decide if an
employer made reasonable accommodations for a disabled employee.5
1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328C(b) (1965); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSERAND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 37, at 236-38 (5th ed. 1984).
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328C(b) cmt. b (1965); KEETON ET AL., supra
note 1, § 37, at 237 (stating that an issue can only be removed from the jury when "the conduct
of the individual clearly has or has not conformed to what the community requires"); see also
Chauffers, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 583 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that the jury is selected for the
common understanding that it represents the community); Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions
of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 116 (1924) (noting that the institution, the jury, is
rooted in "the public's desire to have its conduct judged by the layman (the man on the
street')").
3. See HARRYKALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 163-67 (1966).
4. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12110-12213 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
ADA employment discrimination claims are processed under the same procedures as those
applied to claims alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. §
12117(a) (1994); see also ROBERT L. BuRGDORF, JR., DisABILITY DiSCRIMINATON IN EMPLOYMENT
LAw 507 (1995). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") enforces ADA
employment provisions. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116; see also BURGDORF, supra, at 507-08. The
administrative enforcement process begins when a person alleging discrimination files a charge
in writing and under oath with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 20OOe-5(a)-(b); see also BURGDORF,
supra, at 508. The EEOC notifies the employer of the nature of the claim and conducts an
investigation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); see also BURGDORF, supra, at 508.
After the investigation, if the EEOC finds that the charge has merit, it attempts to elimi-
nate the unlawful practice through informal methods. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); see also
BTiRGDORF, supra, at 508. If the informal process fails to produce a satisfactory conciliation in
the opinion of the EEOC, the Commission may bring an action against the employer in federal
court. See 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5(f)(1); see also BURGDORF, supra, at 508.
On the other hand, if the EEOC believes that there is no reasonable cause to believe the
charge is valid, it notifies the parties of this finding. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); see also
BURGDORF, supra, at 508. If on this basis, or some other, the EEOC declines to sue the
employer, the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter to the complainant. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f)(1); see also BURGDORF, supra, at 517. At this point, the aggrieved person may bring suit in
federal court.
5. See 42 U.S.C § 12111(a) (defining reasonable accomodation); H.R. REP. No. 101-485(H),
at 62 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 344 ("the decision as to what reasonable
accommodation is appropriate is one which must be determined based on the particular facts of
the individual case"). Whether an employee is protected by the ADA requires a specific inquiry
by a fact finder into the job's essential functions and whether "the individual is qualified [to
perform those functions] at the time of the job action." Id. at 55. Whether an accommodation
creates an undue hardship on an employer such that the employer need not make the
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When reasonable accommodations are not made, the presumption is
that an employer has discriminated against the adversely affected
employee.6 By determining whether an employer has made a
reasonable accommodation, juries ensure that society's conception of
reasonableness shapes employers' compliance with the ADA.7
Furthermore, the right to have a jury determine the liabilities of
parties in all legal claims has been cemented in the Seventh
Amendment.8 This Note argues that the right to a jury trial plays an
important role in ADA litigation, and that it should be provided even
where back pay is the only remedy sought. This rule not only makes
sound policy, but the Seventh Amendment requires it.
When the ADA was enacted in 1990, the remedies available
were the same as those listed in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.9 Congress intended that the remedies for discrimination on the
basis of race and sex prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would
be the same as those for discrimination on the basis of disability, even
if Title VII was amended. 0 These remedies included enjoining an
employer from engaging in unlawful conduct, ordering the reinstate-
ment or hiring of employees, awarding back pay," "or any other equi-
reasonable accomodation is a case-by-case determination. See id. at 64. An accommodation
might be considered an undue hardship because it is "unduly costly, extensive, substantial, [or]
disruptive." Id. at 67. "[W]hether a reasonable accommodation constitutes an 'undue
hardship'... depend[s] on the facts of a particular situation and turns on the nature and cost of
the accommodation in relation to the employer's resources and operations." Id. Fact-based
inquiries such as what constitutes a job's essential functions and an undue burden are the kinds
of issues juries generally decide. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 37, at 235 & n.3 (stating
that juries decide questions of fact).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(bX5XA) (1994) (defining discrimination, in part, as "not making
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability").
7. Presumably, employers will alter their behavior to avoid liability for not making
reasonable accomodations. Thus, the ADA's definition of "reasonable accomodation" will shape
employers' future behavior.
8. The Seventh Amendment provides: "In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." U.S.
CONST. amend VII. As explained in Part I, the Supreme Court has defined a right to a jury
trial in suits that were traditionally brought in a court of law and denied the right to a jury trial
in suits traditionally brought in a court of equity. See infra Part HI.
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117; see also-42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)-(k) (providing for injunctions,
reinstatement or hiring of employees, backpay, or any other equitable relief the court deems ap-
propriate as remedies for violations of Title VII).
10. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(M), at 48-49 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CAN. 267,
471-72. In fact, the House Judiciary Committee rejected an amendment that would have kept
the remedies under the ADA the same even if the Title VII remedies provision was amended.
See id.
11. Back pay is monetary compensation for the tangible economic loss caused by unlawful
employment discrimination. See ROBERT BELTON, REMEDIES IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW § 9.3, at 305 (1992); see also infra notes 198-205 and accompanying text.
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table relief as the court deems appropriate."12 Neither the ADA nor
Title VII addressed the right to a jury trial.
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress broadened the reme-
dies available for intentional discrimination to include compensatory
damages for "future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, in-
convenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life,... nonpecu-
niary losses" and punitive damages.'3 When these remedies are
sought under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress has expressly
given either party the right to demand a jury trial. 4 Back pay,
however, is specifically excluded from this list of compensatory
remedies, 5 and therefore a claim for back pay does not necessarily
provide a right to a jury trial under the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
The Supreme Court has not decided whether a party has a
right to a jury trial in an ADA or Title VII claim where back pay
damages, but no other compensatory or punitive damages, are
sought.16 Several courts of appeals have denied a jury trial in Title
VII cases where the plaintiff seeks only back pay. 7 No court of
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (1994).
14. See 42 U.S.C.§ 1981a(c).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2). For clarity this Note will continue to refer to back pay as
not included in the compensatory damages mentioned in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
16. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 252-53 n.4 (1994) ("We have not
decided whether a plaintiff seeking backpay under Title VII is entitled to a jury trial.");
Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 572 (1990) (assuming,
but not holding that a Title VII plaintiff does not have a right to a jury trial); Lytle v. Household
Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 549 n.1 (1990) (stating that "under Fourth Circuit precedent, a plaintiff
does not have a right to a jury trial on a Title VII claim").
Arguably, the Supreme Court has decided back pay under Title VII is an equitable claim,
and therefore, no Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial attaches. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has never explicitly decided whether a party is entitled to a jury trial under Title VII when
only back pay is sought. In dicta, the Court has stated that its previous decisions show that
back pay under Title VII is equitable. In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 190 (1974), the issue
was whether parties may demand a jury trial for a claim under the fair housing provision of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968. The Court noted that "[i]n Title VII cases the courts of appeals have
characterized backpay as an integral part of an equitable remedy," but the Court did not express
a view on the jury trial question. Id. at 197. The Curtis Court was simply comparing the statu-
tory language authorizing back pay under Title VII, that the courts of appeals have held to be
an equitable remedy, with fair housing remedies that plainly authorize "actual and punitive
damages." Id. It made no holding regarding the right to a jury trial under Title VII. In
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975), the Court looked to Curtis for the
proposition that back pay discretion is equitable in nature. It then stated that although a
court's discretion to award back pay is equitable in nature, it is not unfettered. See id. The
Court did not address whether back pay is equitable under a Seventh Amendment analysis, or
the right to a jury trial. In more recent cases, the Court has read Moody as labeling back pay
under Title VII an equitable remedy. See, e.g., Terry, 494 U.S. at 571-72. It has not held,
however, that back pay under Title VII is an equitable remedy, thus denying the right to a jury
trial.
17. See Sullivan v. School Bd., 773 F.2d 1182, 1187 (11th Cir. 1985) (explaining that back
pay is an equitable claim under Title VII or § 1983); Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d
798
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appeals, however, has expressly decided whether a right to a jury trial
exists in ADA claims seeking only back pay.
Under the ADA, two district courts have denied a jury trial on
a claim solely for back pay. 8 In doing so, one court noted that back
pay under the ADA and Title VII is an open question, but it inferred
from the 1991 Civil Rights Act's exclusion of back pay from
compensatory damages that Congress intended to exclude a right to a
jury trial.19 The second district court did not put to the jury the
question of whether back pay should be awarded, even though the
jury found the defendant liable for compensatory damages, because,
according to the court, back pay was at the discretion of the judge.20
In addition, another district court has interpreted the express
provision of the right to a jury trial in claims for compensatory and
punitive damages to mean that Congress's silence on the right to a
jury trial under Title H of the ADA (public employer discrimination)
indicates that no right to a jury trial exists where only back pay is
sought.21
918, 929 (9th Cir. 1982) (characterizing back pay as "either equitable or... a legal remedy
incidental to an equitable cause of action"); Harmon v. May Broad. Co., 583 F.2d 410, 411 (8th
Cir. 1978) ("An award of back pay under Title VII for discriminatory employment practices is an
integral part of the equitable remedy of reinstatement and is not comparable to damages in a
common law action for breach of employment contract."); Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094
(9th Cir. 1975) (finding that back pay is an integral part of an equitable remedy); EEOC v.
Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 308 (6th Cir. 1975) ("Back pay in Title VII cases is considered
a form of restitution, not an award of damages. Since restitution is an equitable remedy a jury
is not required for the award of back pay."); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th
Cir. 1971) (stating that back pay is equitable since it is intended to restore receipients to their
rightful economic status); Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. Sch. Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 324 (5th Cir 1970)
(noting that back pay is an "integral part of the equitable remedy of injunctive reinstatement");
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969) (describing back
pay as an "integral part of the statutory equitable remedy").
18. See Dutton v. Johnson County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1260, 1264 (D.
Kan. 1994) (allowing jury to decide liability, but not back pay award); Braverman v. Penobscot
Shoe Co., 859 F. Supp. 596, 605-06 (D. Me. 1994) (allowing a jury trial on liability and damages,
but reserving for the court the decisions on back pay and reinstatement).
19. See Braverman, 859 F. Supp. at 606 ("Whether a plaintiff who seeks backpay under
either the ADA or Title VII is entitled to a jury trial is an open question.").
20. See Dutton, 868 F. Supp. at 1263-64.
21. See Outlaw v. City of Dothan, No. CV-92-A-1219-S, 1993 WL 735802, at *7 (M.D. Ala.
April 27, 1993) (stating that on motion to strike jury trial demand, court found no language
granting right to a jury trial in Title II ADA cases but "[t]he fact that Congress expressly stated
that Title I of the ADA does allow for a trial by jury is evidence that their silence on Title H can
be interpreted to mean that they did not intend to extend the right to a jury trial to Title H
plaintiffs"). Another district court, however, denied a defendant's motion to strike a jury trial in
a Rehabilitation Act and Title I1 ADA employment discrimination case because under both Acts
the plaintiff sought the full spectrum of equitable and legal remedies. See Hernandez v. City of
Hartford, 959 F. Supp. 125, 134 (D. Conn. 1997).
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Courts are divided on whether the right to a jury trial exists
when back pay is sought under other employment discrimination
statutes. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which provides public
employees the same protection from disability discrimination that the
ADA provides to private employees,22 has been interpreted by at least
one court to require a jury trial.2 In Waldrop v. Southern Co.
Services, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a jury
trial was necessary because the plaintiff sought back pay and
liquidated damages but not the "compensatory or punitive damages"
provided in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.24 By analogy, the right to a
jury trial should also apply to claims only for back pay under the
ADA.
In § 1981 and § 1983 violations, the courts of appeals have
disagreed about the right to a jury trial, and have focused primarily
on whether the relief sought is legal or equitable.2 The Third, Fifth,
Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have denied the right to a jury trial when
only back pay is sought.26  The First, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits,
however, have provided a right to a jury trial under the same
22. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-7976 (1994 & Supp. II. 1996); see also
H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 62, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 344 (explaining that the
duty to make reasonable accommodations "has been included as a form of non-discrimination on
the basis of disability for almost fifteen years under section 501 and section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973"); id. at 67, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. at 349 (noting that undue
hardship "is derived from and should be applied consistently with... regulations implementing
section 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973"); see also School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273, 287 n.17 (1987) (adopting language almost identical to the ADA).
23. See Waldrop v. Southern Co. Servs., Inc., 24 F.3d 152, 159 (11th Cir. 1994) (treating
plaintiffs claim for back pay as compensatory damages and thus requiring a jury trial).
24. Id. at 154, 159. The district court found that the plaintiff had failed to specify the
compensatory damages under a pretrial order and therefore waived his right to these damages.
See id. at 155. But see Rivera Flores v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 776 F. Supp. 61, 71 (D.P.R. 1991)
(finding no right to a jury under the Rehabilitation Act because courts have consistently denied
a right to a jury trial under Title Vfl).
25. Section 1981 lawsuits prohibit "discrimination in the making or enforcement of
contracts against, or in favor of, any race." McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S.
273, 295 (1976). Section 1983 lawsuits can be used to redress a violation of any citizen's civil
rights. More specifically, § 1983 prohibits employment discrimination based on one's race,
religion, or sex that is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See MARK A.
ROTHETEIN & LANCE LiBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAw 230 (4th ed. 1998).
26. See Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 733 F.2d 260, 263 (3d Cir. 1994) (characterizing back pay
under § 1983 as equitable relief); Moore v. Sun Oil Co., 636 F.2d 154, 156 (6th Cir. 1980)
(holding, in § 1981 action, that back pay is equitable relief and thus parties have no right to a
jury trial); Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 613 F.2d 245, 250 (10th Cir. 1979) (indicating that back
pay is equitable relief under § 1983); Hildebrand v. Board of Trustees of Mich. State Univ., 607
F.2d 705, 708 (6th Cir. 1979) (finding that no right to a jury trial exists for back pay); Lynch v.
Pan American World Airways, Inc., 475 F.2d 764, 765 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that a complaint
under § 1981 was essentially equitable despite plaintiffs request for back pay).
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circumstances.2 7  Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA7), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that parties had a
right to a jury trial, reasoning that a claim for back pay was legal in
nature.28 The Supreme Court affirmed the right to a jury trial, but on
the ground that Congress intended to provide for such a right.29
If courts continue to follow the trend set by the district courts
of granting a jury trial if an ADA plaintiff seeks compensatory or pu-
nitive damages, 30 but denying a jury trial when only back pay is
sought, the right to a jury trial under the ADA will depend on the
type of damages requested. This does not make sound policy, and the
denial of a jury trial on a legal claim violates the Seventh
Amendment.
If the right to a jury trial depends on the type of damages
sought, a plaintiff may want to avoid a jury trial by not seeking
compensatory or punitive damages. A plaintiff may limit the
damages requested to injunctive relief and back pay to deprive the
defendant of a jury trial.31 These strategic pleadings, however, are
contrary to the policy of the modern Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which attempt to avoid strategic pleading by making the procedure
simple and straightforward. 32
On the other hand, a plaintiff who wants a jury trial may be
denied that right even if the plaintiff alleges the full spectrum of
damages available under the ADA. Normally, a plaintiff seeking
compensatory and punitive damages on any claim of intentional dis-
27. See Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527, 1529 n.4 (11th Cir. 1990)
(finding right to jury trial on § 1981 claim); Santiago-Negron v. Castro-Davila, 865 F.2d 431, 441
(1st Cir. 1989) (stating that "back pay as a factor in compensatory damages" must be submitted
to the jury); Lincoln v. Board of Regents, 697 F.2d 928, 934 (11th Cir. 1983) (explaining that
damages under § 1981 are by their nature legal and provide a right to jury trial); Setser v.
Novack Inv. Co., 638 F.2d 1137, 1142 (8th Cir. 1981) (concluduing that back pay determinations
"are inherently in the nature of legal damages and require a jury trial"). The Seventh Circuit
has not even considered equitable versus legal relief. See, e.g., Webb v. City of Chester, 813
F.2d 824, 836 (7th Cir. 1987) (reviewing jury award for excessiveness, but not questioning
plaintiffs right to jury trial and award); Crawford v. Gamier, 719 F.2d 1317, 1324 (7th Cir.
1983) (finding that evidence supports jury damages award, but not questioning right to have
jury determine the award); Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164, 1166, 1172 (7th Cir. 1981)
(assessing damages award, not right to have jury make award).
28. See Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F.2d 950,954 (4th Cir. 1977), affd, 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
29. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 585 (1978).
30. Parties alleging compensatory and punitive damages have a right to a jury trial under
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (1994).
31. For an example of how a basic ADA complaint could be pleaded to avoid a jury trial,
see FEDERAL PROCEDURAL FORMS § 45:292, at 423-26 (Mike Cole ed., 1998).
32. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941)
("Litigation is the pursuit of practical ends, not a game of chess.").
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crimination under the ADA has a right to a jury trial.33 If the dis-
criminatory act occurs after an employer's good faith attempt to ac-
commodate an employee, however, the good faith attempt provides an
affirmative defense to the compensatory and puhitive damages
claims.34 If the judge dismisses these compensatory and punitive
damages, then the right to a jury trial is lost. The plaintiff is left with
only injunctive relief and back pay, and no express statutory right to a
jury trial.
This arbitrary nature of gaining the right to a jury trial runs
counter to the Seventh Amendment. The Seventh Amendment guar-
antees a right to a jury trial in any civil legal action.35 The Supreme
Court has outlined only limited exceptions to this rule. Primarily, the
Court has ruled that some claims are equitable rather than legal in
nature, and are therefore exempt from the Seventh Amendment. 6 If
discrimination under the ADA involves a contested legal right, then
absent a principled exception, the parties should have a right to a jury
trial under the Seventh Amendment.37
Normally when the right to a jury trial is at issue, the Court
first looks to see if Congress provided the right to a jury trial38 If the
Court does not find that Congress provided an express right, it then
decides if a constitutionally protected Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial exists.39 If the Court determines that Congress has created
a legal right, a jury trial is required under the Seventh Amendment,
regardless of whether an express right exists.40 Instead of determin-
ing whether back pay under Title VII and the ADA is a legal or equi-
table claim under the Seventh Amendment, however, the Supreme
Court has only looked to see if Congress considers back pay a legal or
equitable remedy in Title VII's text.41
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3).
35. U.S. CoNST. amend. VII; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
36. See infra Part III.A.
37. See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830) (stating that the Seventh
Amendment requires a jury trial in "suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and de-
termined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized").
38. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,585 (1978) (holding that Congress intended to
provide a right to a jury trial from an interpretation of the language of the ADEA).
39. See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-27 (1987) (analyzing first whether
Congress intended to provide a right to a jury trial, then whether a Seventh Amendment right
existed); of Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 577 ("Because we find the statutory issue dispositive, we need
not address the constitutional issue.").
40. See Parsons, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 448.
41. The closest the Supreme Court has come to determining whether a right to a jury trial
for back pay under Title VII exists was in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416
(1975), where the Court noted that a court's discretion to award back pay generally is equitable,
802 [Vol. 52:795
ASSERTING THE SEVENTHAMENDMENT
This Note argues that Congress has not expressed an intent
regarding a right to a jury trial for back pay under the ADA. Further,
it argues that even if Congress had denied the right to a jury trial un-
der the ADA, parties are entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment.
Part H demonstrates that Congress has never considered
whether a claim for back pay under the ADA is a legal or equitable
claim, or whether back pay should include a right to a jury trial.
Thus, finding a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial under the
ADA does not contradict Congress's intent. This section also
compares the ADA with analogous provisions in the ADEA, in which
the Supreme Court found that Congress intended to provide a right to
a jury trial on back pay claims.
Part III of this Note explores how the Supreme Court has de-
termined if a right to a jury trial exists under the Seventh
Amendment. Specifically, Part III lays out the Court's two-part test:
(1) the historical characterization of the claim as either legal or
equitable in nature; and (2) the type of relief sought. This section also
explains the exceptions to the general rule under this test that actions
involving monetary damages are legal in character. The Court has
deemed actions for restitution, legal relief that is incidental to an
equitable claim, and remedies left to the discretion of judges to be
equitable actions.4 2
Part IV applies the two-part test to back pay under the ADA,
and argues that it is properly seen as a legal claim. The conclusion
suggests that Congress should amend the remedies available under
the ADA to include a right to a jury trial, or, in the alternative, that
the Supreme Court should declare that such a right exists for back
pay claims.
II. CONGRESS HAS EXPRESSED No INTENT REGARDING
THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL UNDER THE ADA
Courts that have denied the right to a jury trial under the ADA
have based their decision on Congress's intent not to provide a right
to a jury trial when only back pay is sought.43 These courts have
but avoided discussing whether back pay awards under Title VII specifically constituted
equitable relief.
42. See infra Part flI.B.
43. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
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noted two pieces of evidence for this proposition: (1) back pay is listed
with equitable remedies available under Title VII; and (2) the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 does not provide a right to a jury trial on back
pay."
A. Statutory Text Does Not Indicate that Congress Intended
Back Pay to be an Equitable Remedy
The remedies available under the ADA are the same as those
listed in Title VII.45 Therefore, a brief analysis of the text of Title VII
is important. Courts, including the Supreme Court, that have held
that back pay under Title VII is an equitable claim have looked to its
statutory language for support.46 For example, in Curtis v. Loether
the Court compared the text of Title VII, which the courts of appeals
have held not to require a jury trial, with the text of Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968.47 The Court used the contrast in statutory
language to hold that a right to a jury trial attached to Title VIII.48
The Court also distinguished back pay and the right to a jury trial for
a violation of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") from
back pay under Title VII, and held that the right to a jury trial at-
tached to the LMRA.49
Title VII provides for "reinstatement or hiring of employees,
with or without back pay.., or any other equitable relief."0 The
phrase "[alny other equitable relief' implies that at least one
equitable remedy precedes this quotation. Otherwise, it would not be
sensible to include the word "other." The word "other" does not
require, however, that all the remedies mentioned before it are
equitable. Reinstatement and hiring of employees, which are tradi-
tionally equitable remedies, could be the other equitable relief men-
tioned in the statute. Thus, the language from Title VII does not con-
clusively indicate whether or not back pay should be considered equi-
table.
44. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text; cf Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197
(1974) (noting that Title VII lists back pay with other equitable relief).
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994).
46. See, e.g., Curtis, 415 U.S. at 197 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5(g) (1994)).
47. See id. Thus, an argument can be made that when Congress enacted the ADA, it
presumably knew the courts of appeals generally regarded Title VII as an equitable claim with
no right to a jury trial, and that it intended the ADA lawsuits to be treated the same.
48. See id. at 198.
49. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 571-72
(1990) (noting that Congress specifically designated back pay under Title VII as equitable relief).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(gX1) (1994).
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In Lorillard v. Pons, the Supreme Court held that in claims for
lost wages under the ADEA, Congress intended to provide a right to a
jury trial.51 The Court based its decision in part on language in the
ADEA allowing individuals to bring actions for "legal or equitable
relief," including compelled employment, reinstatement, promotion
and back pay.52  The Court noted that judgments compelling
employment, reinstatement and promotion are equitable relief, and
that legal relief must therefore refer to back pay.53
While the ADEA provides "legal or equitable remedies," no
similar provision exists in the ADA or the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5
The absence of text stating that only equitable relief is available
buttresses the contention that Congress did not even consider
whether ADA back pay relief is equitable or legal.55
Further, Lorillard adds weight to the possibility that if
Congress had considered the right to a jury trial under the ADA it
would have provided for it. If Congress was willing to authorize a
jury trial on claims for back pay in age discrimination cases, it is not
unreasonable to think that Congress might also consider the right to a
jury trial in disability discrimination cases. Unless a difference exists
between age discrimination and disability discrimination, perhaps
Congress should include a jury trial on issues of back pay under the
ADA as well for the purpose of uniformity.
51. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584-85 (1978). This Note assumes that lost wages are
the same as back pay under the ADEA. Although the statute does not use the words "back pay,"
the ADEA provides for "[a]mounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this chapter."
29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 583.
53. See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 583 n.l.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. The heading for section 706(g) of the Civil Right Act of 1964 lists:
"Wjunctions; appropriate affirmative action; equitable relief; accrual of back pay; reduction of
back pay; limitations on judicial orders." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. Although "legal relief" is not
specifically mentioned, the separate label for the accrual of back pay in addition to the heading
for equitable relief could be read as an acknowledgement by Congress that back pay does not fit
under the equitable relief category. Another reading is that the headings offer a preview of the
text of the statute in the order that it will be addressed. Accrual and reduction of back pay are
mentioned separately because provisions on these topics follow the general provision of equita-
ble relief that includes back pay.
55. Congress has amended the ADEA to include a right to "trial by jury of any issue of fact
in any action for recovery of amounts owing as a result of a violation of [the Act], regardless of
whether equitable relief is sought by any party in such action." 29 U.S.C. § 626(cX2). Back pay
may be sought under the ADEA as a remedy for discrimination. The enforcement provisions of
the ADEA are modeled after the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") rather than Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580.
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B. Back Pay Was Not Considered in the Civil Rights Act of 1991
Plaintiffs have had the, right to back pay and reinstatement
since the ADA was adopted in 1990.56 The Civil Rights Act of 1991
created additional compensatory and punitive damages and a right to
a jury trial when a plaintiff seeks these remedies under Title VII and
the ADA. 57 The Act also provided an affirmative defense of a "good
faith" attempt to accommodate, but applied this defense only to
claims for compensatory or punitive damages. 58 Congress mentioned
back pay in the 1991 Act only to note that it does not count as com-
pensatory damages, 59 possibly to exclude back pay from the affirma-
tive defense. 60
One would not expect back pay to be mentioned in the 1991
Act since, as the House Committee on Education and Labor Report
stated, the Act's purpose was to strengthen the remedial scheme
available to victims of discrimination.61 The Act was concerned with
creating new remedies, not adjusting those currently available. Since
the Act did not state that an ADA claim solely for back pay would
entitle parties to a jury trial, or that a jury trial was not required
when only back pay is sought, Congress expressed no intent regarding
a right to a jury trial for back pay in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
This finding is supported by legislative history, which indicates
that Congress considered only whether it was constitutional to
provide additional compensatory and punitive remedies without a
right to a jury trial.62 The House Committee on Education and Labor
rejected an amendment that would have eliminated the right to a jury
trial, because it might have violated the Seventh Amendment. 63 In
this discussion, however, no legislative history indicates that
Congress considered the constitutionality of whether back pay under
the ADA could be awarded without a right to a jury trial.
In sum, Congress did not express an intent regarding the
provision of the right to a jury trial for back pay in the ADA, its
remedies provided in Title VII, or the Civil Rights Act of 1991. This
finding challenges the district courts' rationale for denying a right to a
56. See 42 U.S.C.§ 12117(a) (1994) (adopting the remedies set forth in the Civil Rights Act,
including reinstatement and back pay, as the ADA's remedies); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(g).
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(bX3) (1994).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(aX3).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2).
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3).
61. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 64 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. 549,602.
62. See id. at 72, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CAN. at 610.
63. See id. at 101-03, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CAN. at 639-41.
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jury trial for back pay under the ADA. Although a finding that
Congress did not intend to provide a jury trial could be challenged
under the Seventh Amendment, the Supreme Court has indicated an
aversion to making decisions on constitutional grounds. 64 While the
Court must consider a Seventh Amendment constitutional challenge
to a statute, it is probably reluctant to find a Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial when the issue can be resolved by deferring to
Congress's intent not to provide such a right and finding no
constitutional problem. In fact, the Court has stated in dicta that the
text of Title VII indicates that back pay is an equitable claim.65
Despite its earlier statement that back pay is equitable, the Supreme
Court, reviewing a Title VII or ADA case on the right to a jury trial
under the analysis that follows, would have to hold that back pay is
actually a legal claim to which the right to a jury trial attaches.
III. THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL UNDER THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
The Seventh Amendment provides that "[iun Suits at common
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved."66 The phrase "Suits at com-
mon law" refers to suits in which legal rights are to be determined,
not to suits in which only equitable rights are recognized and
administered. 67 For Seventh Amendment purposes, all claims must
be characterized as either legal or equitable.68
By the Amendment's plain language, suits at common law that
existed in 1791 must provide a right to a jury trial. In a case decided
in 1830, the Supreme Court recognized that the Seventh Amendment
went beyond "common law" suits to include suits brought under a fed-
64. According to the Ashwander doctrine, the Supreme Court avoids deciding a case on
constitutional grounds when statutory interpretation is sufficient to decide the case. See
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring).
65. See supra notes 16,45-50 and accompanying text.
66. U.S. CONST. amend VII.
67. See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830).
68. See id. (stating that "common law" meant suits in which legal, as opposed to equitable
rights were vindicated). The American colonial judicial system, modeled after the English sys-
tem, was divided into two main jurisdictions-courts of law and courts of equity or chancery.
See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 649 (4th ed. 1996). In courts of law, a jury trial was
available on most causes of action. See id. In equity, however, a judge sat without a jury. See
id. To bring a claim in a court of equity the plaintiff had to show that the typical legal remedy
of money damages was inadequate. See id. Admiralty suits are a third type of claim, see id.,
but they are not relevant to this analysis.
1999] 807
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:795
eral statute.69 In other cases prior to the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, federal courts applied a strictly his-
torical test to determine if an action was more similar to a legal or
equitable action in eighteenth century England, and regarded legal
claims as generally requiring the right to a jury trial.70 A major ex-
ception applied when both legal and equitable claims were brought to-
gether in a court of law. In this case, if the legal claim was considered
incidental to the equitable relief that the plaintiff sought, the right to
a jury trial was denied.71
The Supreme Court has expressed a strong preference for
preserving the right to a jury trial,72 based on the historical
importance and continued relevance of this right: "Maintenance of
the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so
firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming
curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the
utmost care."73 The Court has also recognized that, as a practical
matter, the Seventh Amendment is in part based on the assumption
that a group consensus provides greater assurances of fairness than a
single judge's decision.74 The Court's recognition of the historical and
69. See Parsons, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 447; see also Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193
(1974) ("Although the thrust of the Amendment was to preserve the right to jury trial as it
existed in 1791, it has long been settled that the right extends beyond the common law forms of
action recognized at that time.").
70. See Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 656-60 (1935)
(discussing when the right to a jury trial triggers); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476-79
(1935) (applying historical test to establish Seventh Amendment right to jury trial in negligence
action).
71. See 5 JANES W. MOORE ETAL, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.19[2] (3d ed. 1997); see
also Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1891) (explaining that right to jury trial attaches in a
legal action); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937) (discussing the
relation of both legal and equitable claims to the right to a jury trial).
72. See, e.g., Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 550 (1990) (jury trial right can
only be lost "under the most imperative circumstances").
73. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990)
(quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)). Even the Declaration of Independence
mentioned the loss of the jury trial under British rule as one of the "abuses and
usurpations... design[ed] to reduce them under absolute despotism." Troy v. City of Hampton,
756 F.2d 1000, 1004 (4th Cir. 1985) (Ervin, J., dissenting) (quoting THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE paras. 2, 21 (U.S. 1776)).
Additionally, Justice Black wrote that Alexander Hamilton had "divided the citizens of his
time between those who thought that a jury trial was a 'valuable safeguard to liberty' and those
who thought it was 'the very palladium of free government.'" Galloway v. United States, 319
U.S. 372, 397-98 (1943) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting) (citation omitted). For an
excellent discussion of the historical foundation of the Seventh Amendment, see Kenneth S.
Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 53
OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1005-30 (1992).
74. See Sioux City & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664 (1873) ("[T]welve
men know more of the common affairs of life than does one man; that they can draw wiser and
safer conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge.").
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continuing importance of the right to a jury trial might suggest an
inclination to characterize actions in a way that protects this right.
As noted above, Seventh Amendment protection has been ex-
tended to statutory actions created by Congress75 Statutory actions
require a two-part test to decide which claims are legal and which are
equitable.76
A. The Seventh Amendment Two-Part Test
To determine if an action involves legal rights, the Court has
adopted a two-part test that examines the nature of the action and
the remedy sought. First, the Court compares the statutory action in
question to eighteenth century actions brought in England to deter-
mine if the claim is analogous to a claim brought in a court of law or a
court of equity.77 The Court then determines whether the remedy is
legal or equitable.7 8 The latter part of this test has been given greater
weight by the Court.7 9
1. Nature of the Action
The Supreme Court has discounted the importance of finding
an eighteenth century British analog because it requires an "extensive
and possibly abstruse historical inquiry."80 In a concurring opinion
Justice Brennan called for the abandonment of this part of the test al-
together, suggesting courts rely solely on the second part of the test.8'
Brennan noted that judges are ill suited to "root through the tangle of
[historical] sources" needed to find analogous causes of action.82 Thus,
while the Court has not abandoned the historical inquiry, it carries
less weight in comparison to the Court's analysis of the nature of the
75. See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987) (stating that a jury trial
analysis applies to causes of action created by judicial enactment).
76. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194-97 (1974) (explaining statutory actions
and the different types of possible claims).
77. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 417 ("First, we compare the statutory action to 18th-century ac-
tions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of courts of law and equity.").
78. See id. at 417-18 ("Second, we examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is
legal or equitable in nature.").
79. See id. at 421 (stating that "characterizing the relief sought is '[mI]ore important than
finding a precisely analogous common-law cause of action' ") (quoting Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196)
(brackets in original).
80. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970); see also Chauffeurs, Teamsters and
Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 574 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that
the historical test should be simplified).
81. See Terry, 494 U.S. at 574 (Brennan, J., concurring).
82. See i&L at 576.
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remedy.83 The holdings of the Court on whether certain claims are
legal or equitable in nature because of their similarity to an
eighteenth-century analog do, however, provide some general
guidance.
Prior to the merger of courts of law and equity, courts of equity
had jurisdiction over matters where land or an intangible other than
money was in dispute.84 In Granfinanciera, SA. v. Nordberg, a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy trustee brought a fraudulent conveyance
action to void monetary transfers.85 The Court noted that both courts
of law and equity had jurisdiction over fraudulent conveyance actions,
but where only the fraudulent transfer of cash was disputed, a court
of law generally had exclusive jurisdiction.86 Accordingly, the Court
held that the claim was a legal one and a right to a jury trial
attached.8 7
In Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry,
the Court focused on the relationship between the parties in the ac-
tion to determine whether the claim was legal or equitable.8 Here,
union members alleged that their union had violated its duty of fair
representation when it failed to pursue their grievances for the em-
ployer's breach of the collective-bargaining agreement. 89 The employ-
ees had to prove two issues: (1) that the employer breached the col-
lective-bargaining agreement; and (2) that the union breached its
duty of fair representation.9°
The Court found that the breach of a duty of fair representa-
tion was similar to a trust beneficiary's action against a trustee for
breach of fiduciary duty (an action within the jurisdiction of courts of
83. See id. at 575; Granfinanciera, SA v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989); Tull, 481 U.S.
at 421; Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196.
84. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 44 (citing 1 GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 98, at 183-84 (rev. ed. 1940)). In the nineteenth century,
common law and Chancery procedures were increasingly attacked for their complexity. See
YEAzELL, supra note 68, at 389-90. Courts of law, in particular, were criticized for their
pleading requirements, which involved the selection of a proper writ to serve as a cause of
action. See id. at 390. The judicial system on the state and federal level was reformed through
simplified pleadings and the merger of courts of law and equity. See id.
85. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 36. A fraudulent conveyance is a "conveyance or
transfer of property, the object of which is to defraud a creditor, or hinder or delay him, or to put
such property beyond his reach." BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 662 (6th ed. 1990).
86. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 43-44.
87. See id.
88. Terry, 494 U.S. at 568 (stating that the nature of an action is largely controlled by the
nature of the relationship between the parties).
89. See id. at 562. The employer, however, was not a party to the action on appeal
because it had filed for bankruptcy and the action against it was voluntarily dismissed. See id.
at 563.
90. See id. at 568.
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equity).91 Nevertheless, the Court found that the" 'nature of the issue
to be tried rather than the character of the overall action' " was criti-
cal to the Seventh Amendment analysis.92 While the breach of the un-
ion's duty of fair representation was equitable, the issue of whether
the employer breached the collective-bargaining agreement was simi-
lar to a breach of contract claim-a legal claim.93 Thus both legal and
equitable issues were part of the action, and the right to a jury trial
therefore attached on issues relevant to the legal claim.94
A private citizen's statutory action for damages is similar to a
tort suit because it creates a new legal duty and authorizes courts to
compensate plaintiffs injured by its wrongful breach.95 Since a tort
suit is actionable in a court of law, the analogous statutory tort is a
legal claim.9 Following this reasoning, the Court held in Curtis v.
Loether that a defendant had a right to a jury trial for violations of
the fair housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 97 The
Court found that the claim was a "damages action" to enforce legal
rights, and that parties had a right to a jury trial.98
Similar to a damages action, a lawsuit to enforce civil penalties
is legal in nature.9 In Tull v. United States, the Court described civil
penalties as similar to an action in debt within the jurisdiction of
eighteenth century courts of law.1°° The Court found merit in the ar-
gument that the civil penalties were analogous to a public nuisance
action only available in courts of equity.1°1 The Court did not,
however, decide which type of action was the closer analog to civil
91. See id. at 567. The Court distinguished this from a malpractice action, which is a legal
claim, because of the relationship between a union and its members. The Court found that a
duty of fair representation was akin to a fiduciary duty rather than the duty a professional owes
to a client (the breach of which would result in malpractice). See id. at 568-69.
92. Id. at 569 (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531,538 (1970)).
93. See id. at 569-70
94. See id. at 570.
95. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974); see also Wooddell v. International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93, 98 (1991) (holding that a damages action for
failure to refer union member to jobs is a legal claim to which the Seventh Amendment applies).
96. See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195. In the discrimination context, the court noted that "[alan
action to redress racial discrimination may also be likened to an action for defamation or inten-
tional infliction of mental distress." Id. at 196 n.10.
97. See id at 189-90. That statute allowed for actual and punitive damages of not more
than $1,000.
98. Id. at 195.
99. See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 413 (1987) (holding that equity courts
may not enforce civil penalties and that petitioner had a right to a jury trial on petitioner's legal
claim).
100. Id. at 418.
101. See id. at 420.
1999]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
penalties. 0 2 The Court held that the right to a jury trial should be
provided because the action had an historic legal analog, not because
the legal analogy was better than the equity analogy. 0 3  The
defendant thus had a right to a jury trial.1 4
2. Type of Relief Sought
The more important part of the inquiry into whether a claim is
legal or equitable is the characterization of the relief sought.105
Generally, a legal claim is one that provides compensatory and
punitive monetary damages. °6 In Curtis, the Court stated that actual
and punitive damages are the traditional form of relief available in
courts of law.o7 The Granfinanciera Court also relied on the
importance of monetary relief in finding a right to a jury trial. 108 The
Court noted that an equity court would not have jurisdiction over a
claim for money damages when a like amount could be recovered in a
court of law. 0 9 The Tull Court also noted that a civil monetary
penalty could only be enforced in a court of law.10
B. Exceptions to the Two-Part Seventh Amendment Test
The Supreme Court has outlined three exceptions to the gen-
eral rule that monetary remedies are legal claims: (1) restitutionary
awards;"' (2) money awards incidental to equitable relief;" 2 and (3)
discretionary money awards." 3
102. See id. Instead, the Court relied on the second part of the test-the character of the
relief sought. See id. at 421.
103. See id. at 420.
104. See id. at 427.
105. See id. at 421.
106. See id. at 423 n.7 (stating that a civil penalty is similar to punitive damages, which are
only available in a court of law); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974) (explaining that the
relief sought-actual and punitive damages-constitutes a traditional legal claim).
107. See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196. The Court, however, "[did] not go so far as to say that any
award of monetary relief must necessarily be 'legal' relief." Id.; see also Mitchell v. Robert
DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1960) (noting that "[wihen Congress entrusts to an
equity court the enforcement of prohibitions contained in a regulatory enactment, it must be
taken to have acted cognizant of the historic power of equity to provide complete relief in light of
the statutory purpose").
108. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33,47-49 (1989).
109. See id. at 47-48.
110. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 422.
111. See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570
(1990); Tull, 481 U.S. at 423-24; Curtis, 415 U.S. at 197.
112. See, e.g., Tull 481 U.S. at 424-25; Curtis, 415 U.S. at 197.
113. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 442-43 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring); see also Curtis, 415 U.S. at 197.
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1. Restitutionary Awards
Restitutionary awards, though monetary in nature, have been
considered equitable. The Tull Court defined restitution as
"'restoring the status quo and ordering the return of that which
rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant.'-114 The Court stated
that actions intended to restore the status quo were historically
available in equity courts, while suits that punish through retribution
and deterrence were available in courts of law.115 In holding that civil
penalties under the Clean Water Act 16 are legal actions, the Court
found that civil penalties do not only serve a restitutionary purpose."7
Rather, Congress included these remedies to punish and deter
culpable individuals. The TuU Court rejected the argument that civil
penalties under the statute are an equitable remedy aimed at the
disgorgement of improper profits.118 Since the purpose of the civil
penalty went beyond the mere restoration of the status quo, the Court
stated that the relief provided by the civil penalty was a legal one to
which the right to a jury trial attached."9
The Terry Court relied on similar reasoning when it held that
the back pay available under the LMRA was not restitutionary."20
The back pay that employees sought from their union consisted of
wages and benefits they would have received had their employer
acted properly; it was not money wrongfully withheld. 2' Thus the
relief was not restitutionary, and it was therefore not an equitable
remedy.122 The money damages at issue in the action were analogous
114. Tull, 481 U.S. at 424 (quoting Porter v. Warner Holding, Co., 328 U.S. 395, 402
(1946)).
115. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 422 ("Remedies intended to punish culpable indviduals, as
opposed to those intended simply to extract compensation or restore the status quo, were issued
by courts of law, not courts of equity.").
116. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
117. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 422-23. (stating that the authorization of punishment to further
goals of retribution and deterrence indicates a legal rather than an equitable claim) (citing re-
marks of Senator Muskie, 123 CoNG. REc. 39,191 (1977), who made reference to the
Environmental Protection Agency's memorandum that outlined the Clean Water Act's enforce-
ment policy).
118. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 424.
119. See id. at 424-25; see also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 535-36 (1970) (finding
treble-damages remedy to be a penalty and therefore constituting legal relief).
120. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570-73
(1990).
121. See id. at 571.
122. See id. at 572-73. The Court rejected the argument that National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA") action for back pay should be considered equitable because under Title VII, which was
modeled after the NLRA, back pay had been characterized as equitable. See id. at 571-73. The
Court noted that Congress had described Title VII relief as equitable but had not made a similar
1999] 813
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
to those traditionally sought in courts of law, entitling litigants the
right to a jury trial. 123
2. Money Damages Incidental to Equitable Relief
A monetary award "'incidental to or intertwined with
injunctive relief"' may be characterized as equitable. 124 This rule is
based on the historical fact that courts in equity could provide
monetary awards that were incidental to an award of injunctive
relief.125 The Court considers this factor when deciding if a claim
requires a right to a jury trial.121
For example, in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the
Supreme Court held that an order requiring reinstatement and back
pay under the National Labor Relations Act does not require a jury
trial. 127 The Court stated that the Seventh Amendment does not ap-
ply to "cases where recovery of money damages is an incident to equi-
table relief." 28 In this case, back pay was incidental to reinstatement.
In Curtis, however, the Court rejected the argument that since
back pay under Title VII had been deemed incidental to equitable re-
lief, money damages available under another civil rights law (Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968) must also be considered
incidental to the statute's equitable remedies. 12 9 The Curtis Court
noted that under Title VII "the courts of appeals had characterized
backpay as an integral part of an equitable remedy" because back pay
is mentioned along with forms of equitable relief available under the
statute.80 In contrast, Title VIII contains a plain authorization of
statement about an NLRA duty of fair representation claim. See id. at 572. The Court also
reasoned that although Title VII back pay was modeled after NLRA provisions concerning
unfair labor practices, Title VII was not comparable to an NLRA remedy for the breach of the
duty of fair representation. See id. at 573. Unfair labor practice provisions promoted the public
interest in a federal labor policy while the duty of fair representation concerned the rights of
individual employees. See id.
123. See id. at 573-74.
124. Id. at 571 (quoting Tull, 481 U.S. at 424).
125. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 424.
126. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1974).
127. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1937).
128. Id. at 48. The Court also stated that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to statu-
tory actions, but only common law actions. See id. Such a statement is at odds with the Court's
more recent decisions, where the Court has inquired into whether a statutory-based claim is
legal or equitable to determine if a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial exists. See, e.g.,
Terry, 494 U.S. at 570-73; Tull, 481 U.S. at 418-25; Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194-95.
129. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196-98.
130. Id. at 197.
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actual and punitive damages. 131 Thus, it held that damages under
Title VIII were not incidental to the equitable relief provided in the
statute.
In Terry, the Court held that the "incidental" exception did not
apply, because the plaintiff had only money damages available to
him.132 There, however, the employee had originally sought injunctive
relief in his complaint against both the union and the employer until
the employer declared bankruptcy, and the claim for reinstatement
was dismissed. 33 Since the employee could have maintained a claim
for reinstatement, lost wages under the LMRA arguably are inciden-
tal to the potential injunctive relief provided. 34
The Court appears to have resolved this uncertainty in
Wooddell v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local
71."15 In Wooddell, an employee sought injunctive relief and lost
wages for violations of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act. 36 The Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a
jury trial. The Court also held that his lost wages could not be
treated as incidental to an order of reinstatement, because the
damages sought were to pay for jobs to which the union failed to refer
to him.137 As a result, the wages were not considered incidental to
reinstatement. Rather the reinstatement was considered incidental to
the wages.138
In Tull, the Court held that civil penalties, as a form of legal
relief under the Clean Water Act, could not be deemed incidental to
equitable relief available under the statute.139 The Court supported its
decision on four grounds. First, a court of equity historically could not
enforce civil penalties, so civil penalties could not be awarded inciden-
tal to equitable relief. 40 Second, the Government's purpose in bring-
ing the suit was to recover civil penalties rather than to enforce equi-
131. See id Curtis also noted that the courts of appeals in Title VII cases relied on the fact
that the decision to award back pay is committed to the trial judge. In contrast, the judge has
no discretion in Title VIII cases. See id.
132. Terry, 494 U.S. at 571.
133. See id. at 562-63.
134. This situation is analogous to Title VII claims in which an employee seeks back pay
but not injunctive relief.
135. Wooddell v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93 (1991).
136. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1994); Wooddell, 502 U.S. at 96.
137. See id at 97-98. The Court also noted that the defendant union had conceded that
Terry controlled the case. See id. at 98.
138. See id.
139. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,424-25 (1987).
140. See id. at 424.
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table remedies available under the statute.'4' Third, a potential pen-
alty of $22 million could not be considered incidental compared with
the equitable relief sought.42 Fourth, equitable remedies and civil
penalties are authorized in separate subsections of the Clean Water
Act.'4
Since the government in Thu could have sought civil penalties
independent of the equitable claim, the right to a jury trial "'cannot
be abridged by characterizing the legal claim as "incidental" to the
equitable relief sought.'"144 Taken at its face, the point that legal
claims cannot be characterized as incidental to the equitable relief
sought could eliminate the "incidental" exception altogether.145 A line
of Supreme Court precedent supports this point. In Beacon Theaters,
Inc. v. Westover, the plaintiff sought declaratory judgment on an anti-
trust provision, and the defendant brought a counterclaim and cross-
claim for legal damages under the antitrust laws.146 The Court held
that a decision on the equitable claim would not preclude a jury trial
on issues common to both the equitable and legal claims.147 The Court
stated that it would only allow the Seventh Amendment right to be
precluded in limited circumstances that the Court, at that time, could
not anticipate.'4
Then, in Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, the Court explicitly stated
that no rule exists whereby characterizing a legal issue as incidental
to an equitable one will deprive the parties of the right to a jury
trial. 149 The Court based this finding on the intent behind the modern
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure not to infringe on the right to a jury
trial.150 It noted that prior to the merger of courts of law and equity,
when a complaint alleged both equitable and legal claims, the equity
court could not take jurisdiction over the legal claim because this
would deny the right to a jury trial. 5' When the modern rules were
141. See id. The government was not able to pursue equitable remedies since the defen-
dant had already sold most of the properties at issue. See id.
142. See id. at 424-25.
143. See id. at 425.
144. Id. (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 n.11 (1974)).
145. In fact, some commentators think that this exception should be eliminated. See
Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of
Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 486, 527-28 (1975).
146. Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 503-04 (1959).
147. See id. at 506.
148. See id. at 510-11 (stating that only under the most imperative circumstances can the
right to a jury trial involving legal issues be lost through earlier determination of equitable
claims).
149. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 470 (1962).
150. See id. at 471-72; see also supra notes 32, 84 and accompanying text.
151. See Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 471-72 (citing Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106 (1891)).
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adopted in 1938, this policy did not change. 152 Even though Rule 18(a)
allows the joinder of legal and equitable claims in a single action, Rule
38(a) affirms that the Seventh Amendment right is preserved under
the new rules.153 In a footnote, the Court stated that the Seventh
Amendment protects the right to a jury trial even "if the equitable
cause clearly outweighs the legal cause so that the basic issue of the
case taken as a whole is equitable."1'
This holding was reaffirmed in Ross v. Bernhard.55 Ross was a
shareholder derivative suit that first relied on the equitable right to
sue on the corporation's behalf, and secondly, on legal claims for
breach of a brokerage contract and negligence by the directors.'5 6  The
equitable issue had to be tried before the legal issues could be adjudi-
cated, but this did not change the character of the action into a solely
equitable proceeding.' 57 Thus the right to a jury trial on legal issues
attached.58
Most recently, the Court held that a case may need to be reliti-
gated in order to preserve a plaintiffs right to a jury trial. In Lytle v.
Household Manufacturing, Inc., a case alleging a discriminatory dis-
charge under both violations of Title VII and § 1981, the district court
dismissed the § 1981 claim and held a bench trial on the Title VII
claim, deciding in favor of the defendant. 59 On appeal, the court of
appeals held that the dismissal of the § 1981 claim was erroneous
because a separate remedy was available to the plaintiff. 60 The court
of appeals, however, denied the plaintiffs right to a jury trial on the §
1981 claim in the interest of preserving limited judicial resources. 6'
The Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that "concern
about judicial economy, to the extent that it supports [defendant's]
position, remains an insufficient basis for departing from our
152. See id.
153. See id.; see also FED R. CIV. P. 18, 38.
154. Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 473 n.8 (quoting Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord
Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1961)).
155. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
156. See id. at 538.
157. See id. at 538-39 (noting that "legal claims are not magically converted into equitable
issues by their presentation to a court of equity").
158. See id. at 539. Prior to the merger of courts of law and equity, a shareholder deriva-
tive suit was only available in a court of equity because a shareholder was without standing to
sue in a court of law. See id The holding in Ross suggests that even where an action would his-
torically be considered equitable, the existence of any legal claim is sufficient to guarantee the
right to a jury trial.
159. Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 548-49 (1990).
160. See id. at 549.
161. See id.
1999] 817
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
longstanding commitment to preserving a litigant's right to a jury
trial.'162
Although this line of cases appears to reject the rule that a
jury trial can be denied where a legal claim is incidental to an
equitable claim, the Court continued to mention the exception in
Curtis, Tull, and Terry as a relevant consideration. The Court,
however, has found other reasons for denying the exception's
effectiveness in these cases. 163 Perhaps the Court supports the erosion
of the incidental exception, but continues to mention it in deference to
its historical significance in Seventh Amendment jurisprudence.164
Regardless, Dairy Queen has not been overruled. A legal claim thus
requires the right to a jury trial. That right apparently cannot be lost
by deeming it incidental to an equitable claim in the same lawsuit.
Another reading of these cases is that while a legal claim
(determined by its nature and remedy) may not be ruled incidental to
an equitable claim, a simple award of money damages may be consid-
ered incidental to an equitable claim. Under this reasoning, a right to
a jury trial is still preserved for all legal claims. The outcome of the
analysis, however, depends on the Court's approach to the analysis. If
the Court first finds that the claim in question is legal (because of its
nature), then the right to a jury trial attaches regardless of whether it
is being sought along with a separate equitable claim, as the Court
stated in Dairy Queen. 65 If the Court first finds an equitable claim at
the heart of the action, however, the Court may consider the money
damages incidental to the equitable claim and deny the right to a jury
trial. Since the outcome depends on the methodology applied, the
exception does not objectively indicate whether a claim is legal or
equitable. Rather, the exception can be manipulated to support a
predetermined outcome.
3. Discretionary Money Awards
When the trial court has discretion to award back pay or other
monetary awards, the award is generally recognized as an equitable
remedy.66 For example, in Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc.,
the Court stated that trial courts could award lost wages at their
162. Id. at 553-54.
163. See supra notes 124-43 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
165. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 470 (1962) (stating that the right to a jury
trial is not lost because petitioner seeks redress of both legal and equitable claims).
166. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,416 (1975).
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discretion to serve the purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA').167 Mitchell allowed courts to exercise equitable jurisdiction
when enjoining violations of the minimum wage and overtime pay
provisions of the Act.168 The issue in Mitchell was whether a district
court could also order the reimbursement for lost wages resulting
from the unlawful discharge of employees under the FLSA.169 The
Court held that a trial court may exercise its equitable powers to
enforce compliance with the Act and give whatever relief may be
necessary under the circumstancesY 0  The Court noted that
reimbursement of lost wages was necessary to protect employees who
filed complaints under the statute and had been wrongfully dis-
charged.17'
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the Supreme Court consid-
ered the limits of a district court's discretionary application of equita-
ble remedies. 72 The Court held that the trial court's discretion to
award back pay following violations of Title VII was equitable in na-
ture.173 Since back pay was bestowed on the district courts "as part of
a complex legislative design directed at an historic evil of national
proportions," 174 courts were to use this discretion " 'in light of the
large objectives of the Act.' "175 Thus, the Court held that courts had
the power to award back pay under Title VII to correct the wrongs of
discrimination, but limited this discretion to achieve the goals of the
statute.76
In his concurrence in Moody, Justice Rehnquist noted how
defining equitable actions based on whether a court has broad
discretion effected the right to a jury trial.7 7 When a court has
167. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewlery, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960) (holding that courts
have the "historic power of equity" to award lost wages under the FLSA). The FLSA provides
for "payment to employees of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation" but not
lost wages from an unlawful discharge. 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1994).
168. See Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 294.
169. See id. at 289. The employees had been discharged for filing a lawsuit seeking unpaid
compensation. See id. at 290. The issue of a right to a jury trial was not at issue in this case.
170. See id. at 291 (quoting Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 397-98 (1946), to
justify the implied power to order reimbursement).
171. See id. at 292. Without the prospect of reimbursement, an employee would not take
the risk of filing a grievance against their employer and losing his or her job. See id.
172. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,416 (1975).
173. See id. In other words, the discretionary use of these remedies was to be guided by
equity. As equity is used here, it refers to principles that achieve 'fairness, justness, and right
dealing" through the law. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 540 (6th ed. 1990).
174. Moody, 422 U.S. at 416.
175. Id. (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944)).
176. See id. at 417 (stating that when judges are given equitable discretion the principled
application of standards consistent with those purposes is required).
177. Id. at 443 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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discretion as to whether to award back pay, this discretion causes the
claim to be classified as equitable, and the right to a jury trial does
not attach. 178 If the Court were to require that district courts award
back pay as a matter of course upon a finding of discrimination,
however, back pay would lose its equitable character and would be
subject to a right to a jury trial. Justice Rehnquist characterized a
district court's discretion as somewhat limited by Moody because a
court could only deny back pay for reasons that, if applied generally,
would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating
discrimination. 179 As a result of this case, courts may not condition
back pay on a showing of bad faith, or withhold back pay where a
plaintiff does not request back pay until years after filing the
complaint.180 The more restricted the discretion to award back pay,
the more back pay begins to resemble a legal rather than an equitable
claim for which parties could demand a jury trial.
Despite his concern about a potential Seventh Amendment
conflict if awards of back pay followed as a matter of course, Justice
Rehnquist concurred in this decision.181 He did so because he thought
the Court's opinion still granted broad latitude to district courts in
Title VII cases to decide whether to provide back pay relief.182 He be-
lieved granting courts discretion was based on sound policy, and he
also noted the need to expeditiously dispose of large Title VII class
actions where determining the amount of back pay lost by a particular
claimant is difficult.'8
Tull, however, is difficult to fit into the doctrine that discre-
tionary remedies determine if a claim is an equitable claim. The Tull
Court ruled that while a defendant had a right to a jury trial to decide
the issue of liability, this right did not extend to the decision as to the
amount of civil penalties.184 The "highly discretionary calculations" of
178. See id.
179. Id. at 421. "The courts of appeals must maintain a consistent and principled applica-
tion of the backpay provision." Id.
180. See id. at 442-43 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
181. See id. at 441-44.
182. See id. at 443-44 (stating that broad latitude was not only consistent with the statute
but was supported by policy considerations favoring expeditious disposition of numerous
claims).
183. See id. at 444-45 (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 198 (1941)).
Title VII was modeled after the remedies available in the NLRA. See id. Thus the policy rea-
sons supporting the NLR's discretionary remedies discussed in Phelps Dodge should also sup-
port Title VI's discretionary remedies.
184. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 413, 425-27 (1987). "The assessment of civil penalties
thus cannot be said to involve the 'substance of a common-law right to a trial by jury,' nor a
'fundamental element of a jury trial.'" Id. at 426 (quoting Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156-
57 (1973)). Therefore, requiring judges to determine the amount of civil penalties does not
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civil penalties were assigned to the trial judge.855 The Court spec-
ulated that the framers of the Constitution were concerned with the
abolishment of the civil jury in common law suits, and found no
evidence to show that they meant to extend the right to a jury trial to
the remedy phase.'8 Here the Court was willing to place the dis-
cretionary calculation of the remedy in the hands of the trial judge
because the calculation of the remedy is not a "fundamental element
of a jury trial."187
Thus, in TuU the Court decided that civil penalties are legal
claims entitling defendants a right to a jury trial, but the
discretionary nature of the remedy was irrelevant to deciding the
nature of the claim. If the Court had applied the Moody reasoning
that discretionary remedies make the claim equitable, the Court
would have had to weigh evidence of the discretionary nature of the
remedy as indicia that the action was equitable, and thus concluded
that the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial. Instead, the Court
in Tull excluded the discretionary nature of the remedy from its
analysis of whether the claims were legal or equitable.188 After
deciding that the claims were legal, the Court considered whether the
right to a jury trial also attached to calculation of the remedy. The
same methodology could be used in other claims that require the
discretionary calculation of damages where a court does not want to
define a claim as equitable. The Court then ruled the calculation to
be distinct from the claim itself.
The logic behind the discretionary remedy exception has also
been challenged. 89 Although equitable remedies are applied at the
discretion of the judge in a court of equity,'9° not all discretionary
remedies are equitable. For example, a jury usually has complete
discretion over the award of punitive damages. 19 The judge may also
infringe on the right to a jury trial. See id. at 426-27. But see Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474,
476-77 (1935) (Seventh Amendment prohibits the use of additur); Bank of Hamilton v. Lessee of
Dudley, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 492, 525 (1829) (jury must determine the amount of compensation for
improvements to real estate).
185. Tull, 481 U.S. at 427. The Tull Court noted that such calculations were traditionally
performed by judges, citing to Rehnquistfs concurrence in Moody for this proposition. See id.
(citing Moody, 422 U.S. at 443-45 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
186. See id. at 426 n.9.
187. Tull, 481 U.S. at 426.
188. Id. at 426-27.
189. See Redish, supra note 145, at 529.
190. See HENRY L. MCCLINTOcK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 23, at 49 (2d
ed. 1948) ("Equitable relief cannot be demanded... but is granted in the discretion of the
court").
191. See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 84 (1935).
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exercise discretion on a legal claim where a jury is present by
granting summary judgment, directing a verdict, or ordering a new
trial.192 Thus, the discretionary nature of a remedy is not
determinative as to its legal or equitable nature. Instead, the
discretionary nature of the remedy is merely evidence making it more
likely that a claim is equitable.
IV. BACK PAY UNDER THE ADA IS A LEGAL CLAIM
A claim for back pay under the ADA has the characteristics of
a legal claim and not an equitable claim. It meets both parts of the
test established in the Supreme Court's decisions on the right to a
jury trial in a civil proceeding,193 because back pay under the ADA is
both a claim for the enforcement of a legal right and a request for
legal relief.
A. Back Pay under the ADA Is a Request
for Enforcementof a Legal Right
In Curtis, the Court noted that Title VII creates a damages
action that "sounds basically in tort."1' Like Title VII, the ADA
creates a legal duty between employers and employees. 9- Employers
may not discriminate against disabled employees or applicants. 96 If
employers discriminate, they are liable for damages that the employee
suffers. 197 One of these damages is back pay.
192. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50 (inadequate as a matter of law), 56 (summary judgment), 59
(new trial).
193. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
194. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974); see also DeLeo v. Stamford, 919 F. Supp.
70, 76 (D. Conn. 1995) (noting that actions under the Rehabilitation Act for a public employer's
discrimination of a disabled individual "are comparable to actions brought before courts of law
in 18th-century England-namely, an action in tort to redress discrimination and an action for
breach of an employment contract") (citations omitted).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) provides: 'No covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability...." Under the Act, "Itihe term 'covered entity' means an
employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee." 42
U.S.C. § 12111(2). A qualified individual with a disability includes an individual with "a physi-
cal or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
196. The ADA protects almost all aspects of employment, including 'job application proce-
dures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job train-
ing, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
197. See 42 U.S.C § 12117. "[A]ny person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability
in violation of any provision of this chapter" may seek the remedies provided in the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Id. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
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Back pay is one of the most important forms of relief available
in the ADA.198 It is an integral part of make-whole relief provided to
plaintiffs.1' As a practical matter, back pay accumulates from the
date of the refusal to hire,2 00 unlawful discharge20 ' or denial of
promotion.20 2 Back pay not only includes salary, but includes other
forms of monetary compensation typically provided to employees over
a given period as well.203 A victim of discrimination may also resign
because of the discriminatory conduct.20 4  If reinstatement is not
possible, front pay may also be necessary to account for the time the
employee takes to find a new job.215
Alternatively, a claim under the ADA has also been construed
as a breach of contract claim.206 A district court judge has stated that
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in... an unlawful
employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may... order such affirmative
action as may be appropriate, which may include.., back pay (payable by the employer,
employment agency, of labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the
unlawful practice) ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(gX1) (1994).
198. See BELTON, supra note 11, § 9.1, at 302 (referring to all employment discrimination
laws).
199. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975). Front pay has also been
accepted by the courts as necessary to make victims of discrimination whole. See BELTON,
supra note 11, § 10.1, at 346.
200. See, e.g., Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 571 (1985) (noting that district
court awarded plaintiff $30,000, accruing from the date she was not hired because of her gen-
der).
201. See, e.g., Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250,262 (1980) (plaintiff's back pay
began to accrue on June 26, 1974-the date the district court determined that the college made
its official position not to grant plaintiff tenure).
202. See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 239 (1992) (stating that an employee
wrongfully denied a promotion may recover the difference between appropriate pay and actual
pay); Edwards v. School Bd., 658 F.2d 951, 956 (4th Cir. 1981) (assuming that back pay is
calculated from date of discharge). The back pay period is the time for which back pay is
computed. See BELTON, supra note 11, § 9.23, at 324-25. In general, the back pay period
commences on the date of the occurrence of the unlawful act of discrimination in cases involving
a discrete act of discrimination. See id. § 9.24, at 325. Discrimination may not involve a
discrete act, but instead may be a continuing violation of discrimination law. Such violations
take the form of different work assignments or pay scales based on a prohibited classification
(e.g., being disabled). For continuing violations the calculation of back pay is unclear. See id. §
9.25, at 326.
203. See id § 9.34, at 337 (back pay includes "raises, loss of overtime pay, merit increases
cost of living adjustments, bonuses, vacation pay, shift differential, sales commissions, tips, an-
nual leave, fringe benefits, automobile allowance, and salary supplements") (citations omitted);
see also id. § 9.35, at 338-40 (discussing fringe benefits).
204. See id. § 9.26, at 331. If based on constructive discharge, the resignation will not ter-
minate the employer's liability for back pay. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458,
472-73 (D.C. Cir. 1987), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
205. See BELTON, supra note 11, § 10.1, at 346.
206. See Ochoa v. American Oil Co., 338 F. Supp. 914, 919 (S.D. Tex. 1972). The district
court, however, held that it was bound by the court of appeals decision that back pay under Title
VII does not require a right to a jury trial. See id. at 923.
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back pay under Title VII "finds its historical counterpart in the
common law action for breach of contract by wrongful discharge,
which was... tried to a jury."2 7 The judge noted that Congress could
have provided a solely equitable remedy or confined the remedy to an
administrative proceeding.28 Instead, Congress provided an action
where a wronged employee could recover lost wages. 209 The ADA, hav-
ing its remedies based in Title VII, similarly could be construed to
provide wronged employees the right to sue for wrongful discharge
under a breach of contract theory.
As the Court noted in Terry, the nature of the issue to be tried
determines whether the claim is legal or equitable. In Terry, the
issue was whether the employer breached the collective-bargaining
agreement. Similarly, in ADA lawsuits, the issue to be tried can be
couched as either a tort or breach of contract claim. Curtis provides
even more direct support. Like the legal duty created by the Fair
Housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, the ADA creates a
legal duty binding employers to provide reasonable accommodations
and provides aggrieved employees with the right to sue for back pay
damages they suffer.
B. Back Pay Is a Legal Remedy
Courts have held that actions for money damages are generally
legal remedies.210 Back pay by its very nature is an action for money
damages.2 1' It is a request for compensatory damages to make the
plaintiff whole for an unlawful act of employment discrimination.212 It
is therefore generally considered to be legal relief.213 Only if one of the
Court-recognized exceptions applies 2 4 will the remedy be deemed
equitable.
1. Back Pay Is Not Restitutionary
A claim under the ADA for back pay is not restitutionary relief.
Restitution is required when a defendant has been unjustly enriched
207. Id. at 919.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
212. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 569
(1990).
213. See id.; Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974); see also supra notes 105-10 and
accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 124-65 and accompanying text.
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without providing the plaintiff adequate compensation. 215 When a
disabled applicant is not hired or an employee is either discharged or
forced to resign, the employer does not receive a benefit.216  The
employer cannot receive a benefit from the absence of an employee's
performance at work.217 The employee is not seeking compensation
for work already performed. Instead, an employee is seeking damages
for the infliction of a legal wrong.21 8 With back pay, employees receive
compensation for wages they would have earned if they had been
employed and also fringe benefits.29 Like the back pay for a violation
of the LMRA at issue in Terry, back pay under the ADA is not
restitutionary. Back pay is not wrongfully withheld wages; rather, it
is damages for an employer's breach of a duty it owed to an employee.
2. Back Pay Is Not Legal Relief Incidental to an Equitable Claim
Back pay under the ADA is susceptible to the challenge that it
is incidental to an equitable claim because the statute provides that
the equitable remedies are available "with or without backpay."220
This language implies that back pay merely supplements the
equitable remedies under the ADA. As explained in Part III.B.2, the
incidental exception may not even be constitutional in light of Dairy
Queen. Where a court deems an ADA back pay claim to be a legal
claim in its own right, then the incidental issue is not relevant
215. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS § 1,
at 12-15 (1937); see also id., introductory note, § 149, at 595-96:
Actions for restitution have for their primary purpose taking from the defendant and
restoring to the plaintiff something to which the plaintiff is entitled, or if this is not
done, causing the defendant to pay the plaintiff an amount which will restore the
plaintiff to the position in which he was before the defendant received the benefit.
216. An employer might discriminate in the provision of benefits or some other term of em-
ployment. In this situation an employer would be unjustly enriched and the appropriate remedy
might be restitution.
217. Only in the most perverse sense, where an employee is seen as destructive to the
productivity of the work place, can the employer be said to benefit from that employee's
discharge.
218. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS states:
The remedy of restitution differs from the remedy in damages in that in awarding
damages the purpose is to put the injured party in as good a position as he would have
occupied, had the contract been fully performed, while in enforcing restitution, the
purpose is to require the wrongdoer to restore what he has received and then tend to put
the injured party in as good a position as that occupied by him before the contract was
made.
5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1107, at 573 (1964); cf Redish, supra note 145, at
528.
219. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(gX1) (1994); see also BELTON, supra note 11, §§ 9.34-9.35, at
337-40.
220. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(gX1); Curtis v. Loether, 425 U.S. 189, 197 (1974).
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because a jury trial is required where both equitable and legal claims
exist in the same action.221
Even if the incidental exception is constitutionally valid, it
should not apply to back pay. Back pay is not incidental to the
equitable remedies available under the ADA because it may be the
only money damages plaintiffs receive, 222 and is a significant remedy
because it replaces their entire income over a period of time.2"
When an employee is awarded both reinstatement and back
pay, back pay often is the only remedy of use to the employee. A
study under the National Labor Relations Act of 229 employees that
were granted reinstatement showed that 114 of the employees refused
the remedy because they feared company backlash.2M Eighty-six
percent of those reinstated left their positions within one year, and a
majority of these employees cited unfair treatment as their reason for
leaving.225 Disputes under the ADA are also likely to create animosity
in the work environment that makes employees uncomfortable in
returning to work. A strong argument can then be made that back
pay is more important than the injunctive relief available to a plain-
tiff under the ADA.226 In Wooddell, lost wages were not incidental to
reinstatement sought under the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act.2 27 Similarly, the back pay available to aggrieved
employees under the ADA is too significant to be considered
incidental to reinstatement and the other equitable remedies
available under the Act.
Back pay is too significant to be considered incidental to an
equitable claim. It is an important remedy for those discriminated
against and often may be the only remedy available to them.
3. Back Pay Is Not Significantly Discretionary
Although the discretionary nature of a remedy is evidence of
whether a claim is equitable or legal, as explained in Part III.B.3,
back pay under the ADA is not significantly discretionary to warrant
221. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469,470 (1962).
222. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
224. See Matthew F. Davis, Comment, Beyond the Dicta: The Seventh Amendment Right to
Trial by Jury under Title V!I, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 1003, 1018 (1990) (citing Warren H. Chaney,
The Reinstatement Remedy Revisited, 32 LAB. L.J. 357, 359 (1981)).
225. See Davis, supra note 224, at 1019; Chaney, supra note 224, at 360 tbls.4, 5.
226. Back pay is also an important damage available to plaintiffs, because, unlike other
compensatory damages, it is not subject to the defense of good faith effort to accommodate. See
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3) (1994).
227. Wooddell v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93, 93-94 (1991).
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deeming it an equitable remedy. In his concurrence in Moody, Justice
Rehnquist suggested that the chief reason for permitting broad dis-
cretion in awarding back pay in Title VII cases was to deal effectively
with class actions.22 In ADA employment discrimination actions,
however, this policy rationale makes less sense. Employees have had
difficulty maintaining class action lawsuits under the ADA.229 This
difficulty stems from the individualized and fact-specific nature of
ADA claims.20 Thus, in ADA employment cases where class actions
are unlikely, a judge probably has even less discretion than in Title
VII cases to deny an award of back pay following a finding of wrong-
doing.231 As a result, back pay follows almost as a matter of course.
In this situation, back pay is more like a legal remedy than an equita-
ble one.
Furthermore, denying back pay would almost certainly mean
that an ADA plaintiff receives no monetary damages, because
damages created by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 are not likely to be
useful to ADA plaintiffs.232 The House Committee on Education and
Labor's Report on the Civil Rights Act of 1991 indicates that the
drafters of this Act were mainly concerned with making victims of
race and sex discrimination whole 33 and deterring discriminatory
behavior.2  The Committee recounted the testimony of two victims of
sexual harassment who suffered significant amounts of uncompen-
sated damages, but cited no testimony from victims of disability-based
discrimination.235
228. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 444-45 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
229. See, e.g., Davoll v. Webb, 160 F.R.D. 142, 146 (D. Colo. 1995) (holding that a class
consisting of injured police officers is essentially undefined since class membership does not
correspond to disability definition under the ADA); Lintemuth v. Saturn Corp., No. 1-93-0211,
1994 WL 761231 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 31, 1994) (recommending against class certification for failure
to meet typicality requirement of FED. R. Civ. P. 23).
230. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 172-83 and accompanying text.
232. See Waldrop v. Southern Co. Servs., Inc., 24 F.3d 152, 154-55 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding
in Rehabilitation Act case that plaintiff was unable to specify compensatory damages other than
lost wages required in pretrial order, probably because they were not significant). The Court
noted that it would not be sensible to have the jury calculate compensatory damages but not
back pay because back pay may constitute the major item of compensatory damages. See id. at
159 n.12.
233. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 64 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CA..N. 549, 602-03.
234. See id. at 69-70, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A-N. at 607-08 (back pay alone insufficient
to deter discrimination).
235. See id. at 66-67, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 604-05. The committee noted that
not all compensatory damages result from harassment. See id. at 68, reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.N. at 606. It pointed out that race, sex and religious discrimination could irreparably
harm one's professional career. See id.
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The Committee's emphasis on uncompensated damages from
race and sex discrimination, rather than disability discrimination, is
probably due to the fact that disability discrimination lacks the
invidious character of race-based and gender-based discrimination
that causes mental and emotional suffering. Discrimination against
disabled persons often occurs because of "generalized fears about the
safety of the applicant or higher rates of absenteeism."26 In contrast,
race-based and gender-based discrimination are often motivated by a
dislike or intolerance of the person discriminated against, arguably
leaving the victim more susceptible to mental and emotional
suffering.2 7 A discharge resulting from failure to accommodate where
an economically justified ground may exist seems less likely to cause
the same mental and emotional damages that occur from race and sex
discrimination. Thus back pay will likely be the only form of relief
available to an ADA plaintiff. Under such circumstances, the
Supreme Court probably would be even less willing to give trial courts
discretion in deciding not to award back pay and leave a plaintiff with
no monetary relief.
V. CONCLUSION
The ADA, its enforcement provisions in Title VII, and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 do not express Congress's intentions about whether
a right to a jury trial should exist when only back pay is sought under
the ADA. Further, the remedies under the ADA provided in Title VII
do not establish that Congress considered back pay to be an equitable
remedy. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 also fails to address whether
back pay is equitable. Since no express congressional intent exists, if
courts decide that a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial exists,
they are not acting contrary to the intent of Congress. The courts are
not invalidating an act of Congress. Rather, they are filling in an un-
certainty in the statute.
236. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 58 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 340.
237. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 66-67, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. at 604-05. As
evidence of the lack of economic justification for race discrimination, Title VuI does not allow
race to be used as a bona fide occupational qualification. See 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-2(e) (1994).
Title VII provides:
[It shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ
employees.., on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain in-
stances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to normal operation of that particular business ....
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Under the Supreme Court's Seventh Amendment analysis, a
claim for ADA back pay is a legal claim. The ADA provides an en-
forceable legal right that is similar to a tort or breach of contract ac-
tion. Back pay as a form of monetary damages is generally considered
to be legal relief. Back pay under the ADA does not fall into any of
the three exceptions that the Court has defined to characterize
monetary relief as equitable. First, back pay is not restitutionary,
since the employers are not unjustly enriched by discrimination.
Second, even if the incidental exception is still viable after Dairy
Queen, back pay is probably more important than the equitable relief
available to ADA plaintiffs. Third, back pay is not significantly
discretionary. Courts have little reason to deny back pay under the
ADA where class actions are unlikely. Since back pay is likely to be
the only type of damages available, the cost of denying back pay is
high. Therefore, under the Seventh Amendment, back pay is a legal
claim that entitles litigants the right to a jury trial.
Where a party is denied the right to a jury trial on an ADA
back pay claim, the courts could declare that the Seventh Amendment
is violated and require a jury trial. Alternatively, Congress might de-
cide that sound policy dictates providing a right to a jury trial in all
ADA claims. The right to a jury trial would no longer depend on the
type of damages sought. A jury trial would provide the community's,
rather than a judge's, sense of which plaintiffs are qualified to per-
form the essential functions of a job, what constitutes a reasonable
accommodation, and what qualifies as an undue hardship on an em-
ployer.
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